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Abstract
Seigniorage has often been mentioned as one of the most important and most readily
quantifiable arguments for a government not to give up its monopoly in base money. The
analysis shows that the measurement of seigniorage may lead to very different results and that
it eventually depends on the monetary environment, in which central banks issue and manage
base money. For less advanced countries in Central and Eastern Europe seigniorage has only
been fiscally significant in high inflationary economies and even then the success in
exploiting seigniorage has been limited. Widespread currency substitution has contributed to
the results. Governments in these countries which are willing to stabilise prices but which
lack crediblity to do so, may be increasingly interested in euroisation. More advanced EU-
accession countries have received low revenues from having a national currency over the
recent years. Seigniorage has arisen as a by-product of other central bank’s objectives such as
price and exchange rate stability. This caused high sterilisation costs and valuation gains of
the central banks asset portfolio have often been the main reason for positive results of
seigniorage. In search for a viable monetary regime and in face of further liberalisations of
capital markets these countries may look at euroisation as a choice to achieve price stability
without exchange rate volatility.
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Seigniorage:
An argument for a national currency?
Franziska Schobert
1. Introduction
The idea that each nation-state has its own national currency has become increasingly
challenged not only from countries forming currency unions, but also from countries
considering official substitution of the national currency by a foreign currency. So-called
official dollarization has been vitally discussed in Latin America. Some countries – such as
Ecuador and El Salvador, have actually implemented it. Likewise, official euroisation has
recently been considered in Central and Eastern Europe. The term dollarization or euroisation
describes the unilateral adoption of the dollar or the euro through the means of a monetary
agreement, which falls short of a full monetary union (i.e. not implying institutions to jointly
determine monetary policy). While many have stressed the advantages of such a monetary
arrangement compared to a fixed but less credible peg, one of the main arguments against
dollarization or euroisation is the loss of seigniorage, the revenues from the monopoly in base
money. It is argued that especially in countries with a weak enforcement of tax collection,
seigniorage accounts for a considerable share of budget revenues. But how much do
governments actually earn from having a national currency? The answer depends on the
concept applied for the measurement of seigniorage. And the decision on the concept again
depends on the environment, in which central banks issue and manage base money.
Part 2 starts with a comparison of the different concepts of seigniorage. The various processes
of base money creation and management in their particular monetary environment eventually
determine, which concept should be used. It is also analysed which process of base money
creation may reflect a monetisation of budget deficits and why the existence of assets backing
base money may be important for a government in an EU-accession country considering
euroisation.
In part 3 seigniorage is measured for two groups of countries. The first group comprises the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and other less advanced Central and Eastern European
countries. The case of the FRY is especially interesting because the Republic of Montenegro,
a part of the FRY, has already chosen to give up the dinar and to introduce the D-Mark as an
official currency. A weak institutional framework and difficulties in raising other sources of
financing budget deficits are common features and support the measurement of seigniorage by
the monetary concept.
The second group consists of more advanced accession countries to the European Union
(EU). The institutional framework of their central banks limits the possibilities to exploit
seigniorage for fiscal purposes. Additionally, the central banks of these countries are faced___________________________________FRANZISKA SCHOBERT ________________________________
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with non-trivial costs and valuation changes when issuing and managing base money.
Therefore, a fiscal concept of measuring seigniorage is developed.
2. Concepts
There is no single measure of seigniorage, which is generally applicable, its measurement
eventually depends on the model and on the policy experiment being considered.
1
Drazen’s statement implies that any measurement of seigniorage depends on a suitable
concept and that the choice of the concept depends on the monetary environment, in which
central banks issue and manage base money. In the following analysis, it will be argued that
the  monetary concept is most appropriate for countries in which financial markets are
underdeveloped and in which the government eventually finances budget deficits at the
central bank. The opportunity cost concept might be most appropriate, if base money is
created by purchases of interest bearing assets or outstanding government bonds without any
substantial costs or valuation changes arising and if alternative financing at the capital market
is possible. And finally, it is shown, that the fiscal concept is the concept that is most widely
applicable and that the two other concepts arise as special cases.
2.1 Monetary concept
In monetary concepts seigniorage (s
m) is measured by the real value of changes in base
money.
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where H is nominal base money (including currency in circulation and deposits of banks at
the central bank), P is the price level, D are absolute changes and  q is the growth rate of
nominal balances.
Monetary concepts are closest to the idea of a government financing current payments by
taking loans directly at the central bank or what is commonly understood as “using the
printing press”.
2.2 Opportunity cost concept
In opportunity cost concepts seigniorage (
o s ) is measured as the nominal interest rate
imultiplied by real base money, h.
3
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1 Drazen, A. (1985), p. 327.
2 Cagan (1956), Marty (1967), p. 72 Friedman (1971), pp. 848-850, Fischer, P. (1982), pp. 300-305.
3 Marty, A. (1978), pp. 437-452, Phelps, E. (1971), pp. 174-178.SEIGNIORAGE: AN ARGUMENT FOR A NATIONAL CURRENCY?
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This measure takes into account the opportunity costs born by the government. These costs
will arise if the government has to finance its expenditure through the issuance of interest-
bearing bonds instead of issuing noninterest-bearing currency. By using a nominal interest
rate instead of a real interest rate it is assumed that money holders increase nominal balances
in face of inflation to keep the real value of base money constant.
4
Most estimates of seigniorage for developed economies use an opportunity cost concept with
a short-term interest rate, e.g. a money market rate.
5 This actually differs from the original
idea of the opportunity cost concept which would suggest an interest rate on government
bonds. The underlying idea for the choice of the interest rate in these estimates is rather based
on the opportunity costs of revenues, which would be foregone if the central bank were not
able to issue base money. Choosing a domestic money market rate is appropriate if base
money is issued by refinancing operations between the central bank and commercial banks in
the domestic money market. Similarly, if base money is created by interventions in the
foreign exchange market, the relevant interest rate will be the rate of return on foreign assets.
In contrast to the monetary concept which calculates revenues from newly printed balances,
the opportunity cost concept takes into account that the central bank receives returns from a
stock of assets accumulated by the outstanding quantity of base money.
2.3 Fiscal concept
The fiscal concept of seigniorage (
f s ) focuses on the net revenues the fiscal authorities
obtain from central banking operations, which are not only linked to the creation of base
money but also to its management.
6 Instead of distributing all revenues to the fiscal
authorities, central banks can also withhold part of their earnings and accumulate reserves
over time. In this case the central bank receives an additional flow of revenues from the assets
backing retained earnings.
7 Although this case may be relevant in practice, the analysis rather
looks at revenues, which could be distributed to the fiscal authorities. This is based on the
assumption that central banks cannot withheld revenues infinitely and eventually distribute
them to the fiscal authorities. The focus of the analysis is actually the measurement of
revenues, which are a potential source of fiscal income disregarding the fact that some central
banks retain earnings temporarily.
k v c b a i s
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4 The opportunity cost concept precisely gives  h i ￿ + ) 1 /( p .
5 See for example Hochreiter et al. (1996), Bini-Smaghi and Gros (2000).
5
6 See Klein and Neumann (1990) and Lange (1995) pp. 26-29.
7 Revaluation reserves can be quite excessive, see Gros and Schobert (1999). Hochreiter et al. (1996)
p. 632, have argued to include revaluation reserves, reserve provisions, deferred income and other
kinds of retained earnings into the measurement of seigniorage, although statutes of several central
banks should prevent excessive capital accumulation, e.g. in Germany the legal reserve is restricted to
5% of banknotes in circulation and other reserves to the Bundesbank’s capital.___________________________________FRANZISKA SCHOBERT ________________________________
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The term  ) (
cb b a i + ￿  describes the revenue of the portfolio of assets held at the central
bank, which comprises assets outside the government sector, a, and government bonds held
at the central bank, 
cb b .
The issuance of base money in order to finance current expenditures – “money printing” – is
shown by  c. It reflects a claim to the government, which is held against base money issued
for the fiscal purpose of financing government consumption.
Costs,  k, arise with the issuance and management of base money. Valuation changes,  v,
occur in the asset portfolio accumulated by previous issues of base money and are included in
the measurement because they arise with having a monopoly in base money.
Figure 1. Concepts of seigniorage
Opportunity
cost concept
h i ￿
Monetary
concept
h ￿ q
Fiscal concept
k v c b i a i
cb - + + ￿ + ￿
Disregarding valuation changes and costs is a precondition for transforming the fiscal concept
into its two special cases, the monetary concept and the opportunity cost concept. As shown
in Figure 1 the monetary concept will arise as a special case of the fiscal concept, if the
issuance of base money takes place by direct lending for current expenditures. The fiscal
concept will be generally equal to the opportunity cost concept, if base money is either issued
by purchasing outstanding government bonds or by acquiring interest bearing-assets outside
the government sector. In appendix A1.1 the link between the concepts is shown in detail by
deriving them from budget identities and in appendix A.1.3 it is shown, that under special
conditions purchases of government bonds may rather be considered as financing of current
expenditures. Then, a measurement by the monetary concept may be more applicable than a
measurement by the opportunity cost concept.SEIGNIORAGE: AN ARGUMENT FOR A NATIONAL CURRENCY?
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2.4 Advantages of the fiscal concept
The monetary concept and the opportunity cost concept are only applicable in certain
situations of base money creation, in which costs and valuation changes can be disregarded,
whereas the fiscal concept should be used, if they matter.
The inclusion of the costs on the one hand is important as having a monopoly in base money
is a source of both revenues and expenditures. Generally it is assumed that the costs of
producing paper money are very low and thus net revenues do not differ significantly from
gross revenues. However, this assumption neglects other potentially significant sources of
costs of the issuance and management of base money. Whereas costs arising from other
responsibilities of the central bank such as banking supervision can be neglected, costs arising
from monetary policies and the management of base money need to be considered.
Introducing on the other hand valuation changes into the measurement of seigniorage is
necessary if large valuation changes arise and eventually can be distributed to the fiscal
authorities. One could argue that valuation changes cancel out over time and that any
valuation gains should be held as reserves. Revaluation reserves are a buffer against the risk
of adverse market movements and therefore valuation gains should not be distributed to the
fiscal authorities. However, the measurement of seigniorage might only matter for a certain
period of time in which large valuation changes arise. If the risk of changes in market
movements disappears at the end of this period, reserves are not needed any more and
valuation gains can be distributed to the fiscal authorities. This is the case of EU-accession
countries which will give up their own currencies, when they join the European Monetary
Union (EMU) or even earlier, when they consider the unilateral adoption of the euro.
Reserves held as a buffer against adverse exchange rate changes to the euro are not needed
any more and eventually can be distributed to the fiscal authorities.
The fiscal concept offers another advantage. Compared to the monetary and opportunity cost
concept it measures seigniorage from the asset side rather than from the liability side of the
central bank. Therefore, it directly looks at the sources of revenues by looking at the items
backing base money. These items either represent assets outside the government sector (a)
such as foreign exchange reserves or inside the government sector ( c b
cb + ) such as all forms
of claims to the government. As shown in appendix A1.2 and A1.3 only the former can be
safely regarded as net assets whereas the latter most likely represents consolidated
government indebtedness. In a fiat money system the items backing base money are generally
not important. The main objective of the central bank, price stability, is pursued without
considering the backing of base money. But if a government considers official euroisation or
dollarization, this issue becomes relevant. The difference is technically important for a
government considering the unilateral adoption of a foreign currency, because it will need to
convert its stock of cash in domestic currency into cash in foreign currency (US dollars or
euros). If there are sufficient marketable assets, i.e. foreign reserves, these can readily be sold
in exchange for domestic cash. However, if base money is backed by net government
indebtedness, which has financed past budget deficits, the government would need to take up___________________________________FRANZISKA SCHOBERT ________________________________
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a loan to finance the conversion of cash in domestic currency into cash in foreign currency.
The government would eventually swap its noninterest-bearing liabilities (its outstanding cash
in domestic currency) into an interest-bearing loan. Does it matter financially for a
government, whether it has to take up a loan to finance the changeover to a foreign currency
or whether it can convert cash in domestic currency into foreign currency by selling assets? In
appendix A2 the case of an economy, which euroises by selling assets (case I) and an
economy, which euroises and needs to take up a loan (case II) are analysed. Given the chosen
assumptions both cases bear the same costs. In practice and especially when assessing costs
over a limited period of time, the financial impact can differ substantially and eventually has
to be assessed case by case.
In this respect, the situation of EU-accession countries is a special case, because losses of
seigniorage would only arise temporarily, if they euroised. To understand this point it is
useful to summarise the special situation of EU-accession countries. A country, which
euroises but has the opportunity to join the European Monetary Union at a later stage
including its participation in seigniorage sharing, will only suffer from lost seigniorage until it
joins the monetary union. As has already been pointed out by Rostowski (2000)
8 the countries
would not suffer from any losses on the stock of assets, which formerly were held against
base money and which they now have spent to convert base money into euros. According to
the statute of the European System of Central Banks, the "monetary income" of a national
central bank of a member country will not remain in the hands of the national central bank.
The monetary income is the return from those assets the central bank holds to back base
money. Monetary income of the central banks of all member states shall be pooled and then
shall be allocated to the central banks in proportion to their paid up shares in the capital of the
European Central Bank (Art. 32.5). The regulation of seigniorage sharing implies that the link
between the size of base money issued by a national central bank (or the assets held against it)
and its seigniorage received is broken. Whereas the contribution of a central bank to total
monetary income of the Eurosystem will depend on the stock of its base money, the fiscal
revenues of the government on it will depend on the capital share, i.e. equally on the country's
share in gross domestic product (GDP) and population.
Thus, a euroised EU-accession country does only lose the return on its asset portfolio until it
becomes a full member of EMU. As soon as it enters EMU it will be entitled to participate in
the sharing of seigniorage though it will not be able to contribute any own monetary income
at the beginning, because it has already sold assets held against base money when it became
euroised. Therefore, it will not contribute to the common pool of monetary income, but other
member countries, which have acquired its assets in exchange of euros, will do so instead.
So what does the backing of base money imply for governments of EU-accession countries
considering euroisation? Central banks, which have backed their base money with marketable
assets sell them and purchase cash in euro. They temporarily lose the return on the assets until
they join EMU and participate in the sharing of seigniorage. In contrast, central banks, which
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have no saleable assets as base money has been created by increasing net government
indebtedness, have to carry the costs of the loan in addition to losses of seigniorage. These
countries are more likely to be confronted with higher total costs, as the relevant period of
time until entry to EMU becomes shorter and/ or as the terms of the loan are more costly. But
if they do not euroise but introduce the euro as they join EMU, they will substitute cash in
domestic currency into cash in euros without substituting noninterest-bearing liabilities into
interest-bearing loans. Under pure fiscal considerations governments may then prefer holding
on to their currencies during their accession to EMU.
3.  The measurement of seigniorage
In this part seigniorage is measured for two groups of countries over the most recent years in
order to assess whether temporary losses of seigniorage would have been fiscally significant.
The first group of countries consists of less advanced economies in Central and Eastern
Europe, which are either no EU-accession countries at all or still in a very early stage of
accession. In contrast the second group of countries includes more advance EU-accession
countries which are most likely to be the first new members of EMU in Central Europe.
3.1. Yugoslavia and other less advanced Central and Eastern European countries
Montenegro, the smaller of the two remaining republics of Yugoslavia, decided to introduce
the D-Mark as the only official currency in November 2000 after having already legalised it
as a parallel currency in November 1999. Thus, it can be considered a “euroised” country,
though it is not a fully sovereign nation-state. In order to assess the loss of seigniorage as a
consequence of the Montenegrin decision, it should first be estimated, how much the
Montenegrin share on seigniorage of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been during the
1990s. Seigniorage is measured by the monetary concept, because neither interest bearing
assets have been accumulated by creating base money nor has there existed any access to
capital markets to finance budget deficits alternatively with interest bearing bonds.
Two caveats have to be kept in mind. First, newly issued bonds are not the only way of
eventually balancing the budget. Lost fiscal revenues from seigniorage could also lead to a
reduction in government expenditures, an increase in foreign aid or even an increase in illegal
sources of revenues. Opportunity costs would then have to be assessed on a wider economic
perspective including lost output due to lower government expenditures and consequently less
tax revenues. However, a reduction in government expenditures, which have been more
harmful than beneficial to the economy, such as subsidising unproductive state companies, or
a temporary increase in foreign aid conditional on a quick implementation of stabilisation
policies, may not bear this form of opportunity cost at all. And finally, the lack of inflationary
financing at the central bank may lead to higher output, because lower and less volatile
inflation provides a better economic environment for investments and may even prevent
economic activities to be driven into the informal sector.
And second, just measuring seigniorage does not give a complete picture of all sources of
financing ultimately enabled by the monopoly in base money. The leaders in Belgrade were___________________________________FRANZISKA SCHOBERT ________________________________
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able to finance their expenditures by various other methods apart from taking loans at the
central bank, i.e. by receiving subsidised credit from state controlled banks and by having
unlimited overdraft facilities on their accounts at the central payments office. These sources
of additional monetary financing eventually caused an increased demand of cash which was
provided by the central bank, though strict regulations on cash withdrawals at banks may have
retarded the leakage of changes in deposit money to cash. So, changes in base money only
partially reflect the rise in money and near-money, which have been possible due to the lack
of liquidity constraints to credits. But statistical evidence on the full range of means of
payments created by these soft credits does not exist.
Seigniorage was not officially shared with the Republic of Montenegro, though some
unofficial agreements of seigniorage sharing may have existed between the two republics.
Montenegrin seigniorage is estimated by assuming a 5% share of total monetary seigniorage
in Yugoslavia (about the Montenegrin share of output and population in the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia).
The results for Montenegro are compared with seigniorage in other less advanced Central and
Eastern European countries, including two former Yugoslavian countries, Macedonia and
Croatia, and Albania, Belarus, the Ukraine and Romania. Weak institutional frameworks in
these countries support the use of the monetary concept as a measure for fiscal revenues from
the central bank, although these countries formally either limit or prohibit fiscal financing at
the central bank (see table A2 in the appendix). However, most of the laws have been heavily
amended in the 2
nd half of the 1990s and even despite being stipulated by law, the fiscal
financing restrictions were not always binding or disguised in other transactions with the
central bank. For example in the Ukraine, the government’s financing needs were not served
by its ability to borrow from the treasury-bill and international markets. Domestic and foreign
investors’ interest in government bills or bonds remained weak, partly because of the
uncertain economic environment, but also due to the government’s reluctance to let the yields
rise to levels that would have been attractive to market participants. As a result, the central
bank purchased a significant amount of treasury bills in the primary market and so it directly
financed the budget deficit of the current period (see appendix A1.3 for the effects to the
measurement of seigniorage). Likewise, the National Bank of Romania was forced to
accommodate large fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficits of loss-making state-owned enterprises in
general and of the agriculture sector in particular during various occasions during the 1990s.
The most egregious case was the surge in money growth, which peaked in late 1994, when the
authorities launched a very large program of subsidised agricultural financing, additionally
injected special credits into failed banks and thereby avoided having to resolve them. The
central bank eventually served the refinancing needs, which arose with these activities.
9 It will
therefore be assumed that the active exploitation of seigniorage beyond the limits set in the
laws was still possible in practice and that the government was not willing to finance fiscal
                                                
9 See, IMF Ukraine country report 1999, p. 57, IMF Romania country report (2000), p. 11 and for additional
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and quasi-fiscal deficits at the bond market.
10 This opportunity may not have truly existed for
the government and consequently, seigniorage is measured by the monetary concept.
In table 1 the results as averages of yearly data are presented. Annual data are contained in
table A1 in the appendix. For each country, the ratio of the change in base money to nominal
GDP is calculated in the first column. This represents the command over resources, as a ratio
to GDP that the government obtained in that period by creating base money. In the second
column seigniorage is calculated as a share of total fiscal revenues (including seigniorage).
Montenegrin seigniorage averaged at 1.4% of GDP in 1995 to 1999 comprising about 2.3% of
total fiscal revenues. It is relatively low compared to Fischer’s results for high inflationary
countries. Here seigniorage generally accounted for well above 2% of output and 10% of total
fiscal revenues.
11
The results of other high inflationary countries, such as Albania, Belarus, Ukraine and
Romania are mixed. Belarus and Romania also suffered from extraordinarily high inflation
but seigniorage still ranges below 10% of fiscal revenues. Only in Albania, seigniorage
comprises more than 10% of fiscal revenues. The Ukrainian economy stabilised after the
hyperinflation in 1993/1994, though inflation remained in the double digits and still
contributed to seigniorage. Nonetheless, revenues from the monopoly in base money have
been quite low. For Macedonia and Croatia, two countries with relatively low inflation rates,
seigniorage is no important source of revenue.
Table 1: Seigniorage of selected countries in Central and Eastern Europe (1995-1999)
Seigniorage in
% of output
Seigniorage in %
of total fiscal revenues
Inflation
rate
Change in
real GDP in %
Montenegro 1.4 2.3 72.0 6.6
Macedonia 0.8 2.5 4.0 1.4
Croatia 1.0 2.3 4.2 3.9
Albania 3.6 17.0 14.8 2.1
Belarus 4.2 9.8 155.8 3.1
Ukraine 2.4 6.3 54.1 -5.6
Romania 2.3 7.3 66.3 -0.7
Source: MONET, International Monetary Fund (IMF) country reports and central banks.
Inflation: Dec. to Dec. change of CPI index (RPI for Albania and Croatia), total fiscal revenues: revenues of the
consolidated budget (excl. non-tax, capital revenue and grants) and monetary seigniorage; because no
consolidated budget figures are available for Montenegro, the figures include “budget revenues of the central
government” and “social funds”.
Looking at .Figures 2 and 3, some of the reasons for the differences in seigniorage can be
explained by cash to GDP ratios and the structure of broad money.
                                                
10 Eventually, a more detailed analysis of the special situation in each country would be needed for more refined
arguments in favour of the monetary concept.
11 Fischer (1984), pp. 302-303, the results were generally based on a longer time period.________________SEIGNIORAGE: AN ARGUMENT FOR A NATIONAL CURRENCY?________________
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Source: IMF Country Reports and central banks.
Figure 3: Structure of broad money
(average 1995-1999)
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Figure 2: Cash/ GDP ratios
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Generally a high ratio of cash to GDP supports high revenues collected from seigniorage. Cash to
GDP ratios are very low in all countries apart from Albania, which strikes out with about 17%.
Even in developed countries with advanced financial systems offering alternative means of
payments than cash, the cash to GDP ratio is usually well above 4%. The economy of these
countries has either shifted to other means of payments such as foreign currency and/ or cash
holdings in domestic currency were economised.
In figure 3 it is indicated, which other means of payments than domestic currency were used in
these countries. The structure of broad money (cash in domestic currency held outside banks and
deposits in domestic and foreign currencies) thus illustrates whether deposits in domestic or
foreign currency were used as alternative means of payments in these countries. Data on cash in
foreign currency are not included, because they are extremely hard to measure, though cash in
foreign currency is probably the most important substitute to domestic currency.
  12 The ratio of
foreign currency deposits to broad money then serves as a proxy for currency substitution.
Especially a high ratio of foreign currency deposits indicates that international currencies are
already widely used as means of payment in the economy, which should lower the ability to
collect seigniorage
 . The share of foreign currency deposits is already about 38% in the FRY
(including Serbia and Montenegro) even though frozen deposits in foreign currencies have been
excluded. Private savings in foreign currencies have been confiscated in the early 1990s and
contributed to the loss of public confidence in the banking system. Nevertheless, deposits in
foreign currencies rose steeply again and reached 60% of broad money at the end of 1999. With
about 60% Croatia has the highest ratio of foreign currency deposits over the period 1995-1999.
Cash ratios to broad money are usually well below 10% in developed economies, whereas in
most countries in this group using deposits at the banking system as alternative means of
payments is still at an early stage. Ukraine and Albania have the highest cash ratios. Apparently,
the pyramid scheme crisis in Albania in 1996-1997, in which the country descended into anarchy
and a near civil war, has led to a loss in confidence in the banking system from which it slowly
recovers. Nevertheless, its success in fighting inflation has not reduced the confidence in using
cash in domestic currency as evidenced by the high cash to GDP ratio. Additionally, Albania has
been an extremely isolated country for most of the postwar period due to rigid dictatorship, which
has limited the use of foreign currencies in the economy. In contrast, the FRY also suffers from a
loss of confidence in the banking system and private households rarely keep savings at banks.
But endemic inflation over most of the postwar period and the openess of Yugoslavia compared
to other communist countries have influenced the use of foreign currencies in this economy for
decades. As in Croatia currency substitution is very common and reduces the ability of the
government to fiscally exploit its monopoly in base money. To some extent this applies to other
countries of the group with low cash to GDP ratios, but relatively high ratios of foreign currency
                                                
12 Most recent studies for Croatia are Feige et al. (2000). The significance of the national currency as a means of
payments would be lowered additionally if cash in foreign currency were included.SEIGNIORAGE: AN ARGUMENT FOR A NATIONAL CURRENCY?
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deposits to broad money indicating a wide use of foreign currencies as substitutes for the national
currency.
3.2  Seigniorage in advanced EU-accession countries
3.2.1 Monetary environment and the process of base money creation
How much do the more advanced Central European countries like the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia fiscally gain from keeping their national currency while they aim
to achieve important preconditions for an early EU-accession, i.e. stable exchange rates, a high
degree of capital market liberalisation and central banking activities sheltered from government
financing?
For these more advanced EU-accession countries with open capital markets a fiscal concept is
most suitable for measuring seigniorage. A fiscal concept explicitly accounts for costs and
valuation changes arising from the monopoly in base money and both are important in the special
environment, in which these central banks issue and manage base money.
Before specifying the suitable concept, the monetary environment and its impact on the process
of base money creation and management needs to be analysed. Some of the more advanced EU-
accession countries targeted their exchange rates in the period under consideration and at the
same time they struggled with high capital inflows putting upward pressure on their pegged
exchange rates. This made interventions in the foreign exchange market necessary, which in turn
created excessive liquidity in the banking system. Thus to drain part of the liquidity these central
banks were forced to use various forms of costly sterilisation instruments.
This special monetary environment is thoroughly described by Nuti (2000) for Poland. The
National Bank of Poland was posed in an inescapable dilemma by net capital inflows and the
rapid accumulation of foreign reserves. Either it had to allow the domestic monetary expansion
brought about by reserve acquisition, possibly at the cost of inflation, or it had to incur hefty costs
of sterilisation and the Bank opted for both.
13 The IMF notes, that the Bank of Slovenia often
found itself pursuing conflicting objectives: tight monetary conditions aimed at achieving lower
inflation tended to lead to an appreciation of the currency, while exchange rate interventions
aimed at preserving competitiveness tended to slow disinflation. To keep the balance between
objectives, the central bank had to engage in second-round interventions and maintain a strong
and continuous presence on the money market.
14 The central banks policy dilemma can be
similarly described for the Czech Republic and Hungary. Aiming at price and exchange rate
stability is the crucial ingredient of the dilemma, but just pursuing one of the two objectives
seemed to be no viable option for these countries. Interestingly, even in Slovenia, which officially
                                                
13 See Nuti (2000), p. 57.
14 See IMF Country Report (2000), p. 39.___________________________________FRANZISKA SCHOBERT ________________________________
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pursued a managed floating exchange rate regime, or the Czech Republic which moved from an
officially pegged exchange rate systems to a managed floating system, the exchange rate
objective of central banks in these small and open economies has remained non-trivial so far.
Accordingly, the process of base money creation should be reflected in the central banks balance
sheet and eventually in their profit and loss account.
Figure 4: Stylised balance sheet
Foreign
assets
(H+SI)
Base
money
(H)
Sterilization
instruments
(SI)
< + ￿ ) ( SI H i foreign SI idomestic ￿
0 ) ( > + ￿ SI H d
CENTRAL BANK Assets Liabilities
In Figure 4 above, the process is shown in a stylised balance sheet. Its structure of assets and
liabilities should reflect the creation and management of base money just described. Foreign
assets are accumulated on the asset side and cover not only base money but also sterilisation
instruments, which are sold to drain part of the liquidity. The return on foreign assets measured
by the generally lower foreign interest rate, i foreign, and the stock of foreign assets is compared to
interest expenses on sterilisation instruments measured by a generally higher domestic interest
rate, idomestic, and the stock of sterilisation instruments. Assuming that the return on foreign assets
is lower than the expenses on sterilisation instruments, a country does not necessarily receive net
revenues on its monopoly in base money. However, the calculation has not considered valuation
changes of foreign assets yet. Because the balance sheet is highly leveraged, exchange rateSEIGNIORAGE: AN ARGUMENT FOR A NATIONAL CURRENCY?
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depreciation cause revaluation gains measured by the depreciation rate, d, and the sum of base
money and sterilisation instruments. If valuation gains outweigh losses on interest income the
central bank will still make gains on its monopoly in base money.
Analysing whether this process can be traced on the balance sheets of the five central banks is
more difficult in practice. Base money on the liability side is easily identified but the underlying
process of base money creation is blurred. Developments of balance sheet items not only include
activities related to the issuance and management of base money but also to other activities
conducted by the central bank. Therefore, it is not useful to look at the entire balance sheet in
order to identify seigniorage. It is more advisable to artificially split central banking operations
into activities arising from the “issue department” and from the “banking department” and only to
focus on the first group of activities.
15
A closer look at the balance sheets of the five central banks in Graphs A1 to A5 in the appendix
confirms that the process of base money creation and management cannot be easily traced by the
overall asset and liability structure of the central bank. Apart from the Bank of Estonia base
money generally comprises less than 50% of total liabilities. Not surprisingly, the Bank of
Estonia is special, because it is basically a monetary authority conducting the strict rules of the
currency board regime. Sterilisation instruments are relatively significant compared to base
money at the other central banks. And the share of base money and sterilisation instruments is
fully covered by assets denominated in foreign currency over most periods. This gives a first
indication of the process underlying base money creation and the choice of the concept.
The issuance and management of the national currency is just one activity among several
conducted by the central banks, which include acting as a fiscal agent or supporting a weak
banking system. For example, the Czech National Bank was involved in restructuring the banking
system by taking over assets and liabilities or guaranteeing liabilities of various banks. The
National Bank of Hungary has issued foreign exchange bonds as part of public debt management.
Therefore the structure of the assets and liabilities side of the National Bank of Hungary has been
dominated by foreign exchange. In contrast, while the asset sides of both the National Bank of
Poland and the Czech National Bank have also been dominated by foreign exchange, the liability
sides are mostly denominated in domestic currency. Thus, their balance sheet structure better
reflects the results of interventions in foreign exchange markets arising from managing base
money.
So what has driven base money creation at these central banks? Transactions at the balance sheets
of the central banks do not give evidence to a significant share of base money created by fiscally
                                                
15 The definitions go back to the Bank of England Act (1844), which divided the Bank into two
departments – the Issue Department which dealt with the Bank‘s note issuing function and the Banking
Department, which was intended and proposed to behave as an ordinary commercial bank, see Goodhart,
(1988), p. 8.___________________________________FRANZISKA SCHOBERT ________________________________
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related transactions. In line with the central bank laws (see table A1 in the appendix) claims to
the budget have been low or zero at all central banks. As already mentioned, the large share of
foreign currency credit to the central government at the National Bank of Hungary is linked to its
debt management in which the bank also used to issue international bonds on behalf of the
government. Now, the state’s foreign borrowing programmes and bond issuances have been
transferred to the Treasury and Debt Management Agency as one further step towards a clearer
and more transparent separation of monetary and fiscal policies. The amount of government
securities held at the central bank is only important at the National Bank of Poland, but here they
consist of old government loans, which are now converted into securities. Any movements are
mainly the result of ongoing repayments by the government or changes in debt servicing terms.
Some caveats may be kept in mind. Securities and shares held by the Czech National Bank reflect
its involvement in the restructuring of the banking system including cash advances to weak
banks. The National Bank of Poland has also lent to troubled banks and additionally has extended
loans to banks in order to refinance central government investment projects. These balance sheet
items at the Czech National Bank and the Bank of Poland are about 10 to 15% of base money. To
the extent that losses on these assets will be incurred, the central bank may indirectly finance the
government as it prevents higher government expenditures, which would otherwise probably be
directly charged to the budget.
Having these caveats in mind, only limited financing of the government or opportunities to
indirectly do so can be identified at the central banks over recent years.
Other balance sheet items, which are most closely connected with the issuance of base money are
claims to banks and, especially in small open economies with pegged exchange rates, foreign
exchange assets. Claims to banks can be regarded as the major counterpart to base money created
by monetary policy related transactions. Foreign assets are generally accumulated by
interventions, and reflect the creation of base money by autonomous transactions. They dominate
the asset side of the five central banks as shown in graph A1-A5 in the appendix.
In graph A6 to A10 in the appendix the development of base money, currency in circulation,
foreign assets and claims to banks are shown for the five central banks. At all central banks
foreign assets have not only dominated the balance sheet but have also closely risen with base
money. Foreign assets have even increased much faster than base money at the National Bank of
Poland and to a lesser extent at the National Bank of Hungary whereas claims to banks, the
domestic source of base money creation, have decreased. The evolution of the balance sheet
items supports the view that the creation of base money was mainly the result of interventions.
16
However, at the Bank of Slovenia the picture is less clear-cut. Though foreign assets dominate
                                                
16 In 1998 the National Bank of Hungary quite openly states that base money is predominantly created by
interventions in the foreign exchange market (Annual Report 1998, p. 126) .SEIGNIORAGE: AN ARGUMENT FOR A NATIONAL CURRENCY?
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the balance sheet and rise closely with base money, the Bank of Slovenia has actively provided
base money to domestic banks by domestic operations. Claims to banks have risen sharply over
some periods in contrast to their evolution at the other central banks. However, the Bank of
Slovenia has differed from the situation at other central banks. It used the sale of tolar bills as
conventional sterilisation instruments and the sale of foreign exchange bills to sterilise capital
inflows that have already been realised, but have not been monetised. Thus, foreign exchange
bills are primarily used to pursue the central banks exchange rate objective but eventually prevent
the sale of more costly sterilisation instruments in domestic currency. The Bank of Slovenia is
successful in pursuing this policy, because banks have a strong motive to purchase foreign
currency bills, since such instruments can serve as collateral for loans at the central bank and can
be temporarily sold bank to the central bank through repos. In fact foreign exchange bills have
reached about 13 % of total assets in commercial banks’ balance sheets in 1997-1998, which
highlights the importance of these instruments for exchange rate interventions, but also for some
monetary policy related transactions at the Bank of Slovenia.
 17
Summing up, the balance sheet structure and the evolution of base money, foreign assets and
claims to banks support the view described above. The central banks apart from Estonia and to a
lesser extent the Bank of Slovenia have issued and managed base money by being placed in a
policy dilemma reflected by high interventions and costly sterilisations.
3.2.2 The measurement of seigniorage
Because of the special process of base money creation and management causing significant costs
and valuation changes, a fiscal concept will be applied. Excess liquidity is issued by interventions
in the foreign exchange market and has been sterilised by costly instruments. Consequently,
considering all revenues and expenditures connected with the issuance and management of base
money, these costs will be included in a suitable concept because they belong to the overall
management of base money.
18 The proposed measure of fiscal seigniorage is:
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The first term, foreign assets (FA) multiplied by the respective interest rates i x, comprises interest
revenues earned on the existing stock of base money (H). The sum of this part of the portfolio of
foreign assets equals the sum of base money (cash in circulation and current accounts of financial
institutions). The currency structure of the portfolio of foreign assets is not known and is assumed
to be equal to the structure of the currency basket of the exchange rate peg for Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic, euro for Estonia and for Slovenia, it equals the structure of currencies, as
                                                
17 IMF country report (2000).
18 Many thanks to Daniel Gros for pointing out this issue.___________________________________FRANZISKA SCHOBERT ________________________________
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stated by the Bank of Slovenia in its comments to its balance sheet at each end of the year. The
investment of foreign assets is supposed to be mainly short term, so interest rates i x are chosen to
be treasury bill rates for the US and three month interbank rates for all other currencies. Thus
revenues earned on the stock of base money depend on the structure of foreign assets FAx in each
currency x and the respective interest rates ix in the anchor countries.
In the second term the costs of sterilisation are shown as the spread between the interest rate paid
on sterilisation instruments i si and the interest rate on foreign assets. Weights q x of foreign
interest rates are again chosen by the structure of the foreign assets as described above. If the
interest rate on sterilisation instruments is not published, it is equal to the domestic base rate or
another comparable short-term domestic rate. It is assumed, that the domestic interest rate must
be at least equal to the lowest domestic market rate, because this rate must be at least offered on
marketable sterilisation instruments.
The last term measures valuation changes on the total portfolio of foreign assets of the “issue
department”. It comprises foreign assets as counterparts to the stock of base money ( H FA = )
and foreign assets as counterparts to sterilisation instruments (SI). A positive  dis the actual
depreciation rate of the currency against its anchor currencies, a negative  dis accordingly the
actual appreciation rate. Because the central banks have large open foreign exchange positions in
their “issue department”, valuation gains are received by the rising value of net foreign assets
when the domestic currency depreciates against its anchor currencies. In this concept it is
assumed that all valuation gains and losses, whether realised or not, are distributed to the fiscal
authorities. So different accounting policies of the central banks are ignored in order to make the
results comparable as already discussed in part 2. If foreign assets are denominated in euro, the
central banks will not need the revaluation reserves any more at the time they join the euro area.
And foreign assets denominated in other currencies have become less important as the central
bank started to target the euro instead of other anchor currencies. They can be sold as the
countries join EMU, because the Eurosystem is already regarded as having excessive foreign
exchange reserves. Accordingly, revaluation reserves eventually are distributed to the fiscal
authorities.
19
More details to the data and methods used for the measurement of seigniorage are given in table
A8 in the appendix.
In case the central bank remunerates required reserves, as for example in Hungary and Estonia,
interest rate expenditures on required reserves i rrRR are deducted. Thus, interest revenues on the
stock of base money are calculated net of interest expenses due to minimum reserves.
                                                
19 At the National Bank of Poland and at the Bank of Slovenia revaluation gains, which are not realised
yet, are held as reserves. The National Bank of Hungary has changed accounting practices in 1999 andSEIGNIORAGE: AN ARGUMENT FOR A NATIONAL CURRENCY?
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The proposed fiscal concept is compared with the opportunity cost concept used in other studies
of seigniorage,
20 where i is chosen as a domestic refinancing rate or other comparable short term
interest rate.
H i S ￿ =
For comparison, seigniorage will be calculated as if the countries had already joined EMU and as
if EMU had already existed over the period. The opportunity cost concept is called “implied
EMU” and differs from the first opportunity concept in two aspects: Interest rates are either
Fibor/ Euribor-rates and base money does not include minimum reserves, because they will be
remunerated at market rates under EMU.
All calculations are based on monthly data from the financial statements of the respective central
banks.
21
In table 2 the results are presented as an average for the period 1995-2000. Annual results are
given in tables A3-A7 in the appendix.
Table 2. Seigniorage by concepts (Average 1995-2000)
In % of GDP Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Poland Slovenia
Opportunity cost concept 1.49 0.67 1.99 1.86 0.62
Implied EMU 0.38 0.30 0.24 0.21 0.10
Fiscal concept 0.19 0.37 0.89 0.02 0.47
of which
+ Net interest revenues 0.43 0.37 0.00 0.36 0.18
- Sterilisation costs 0.60 0.00 0.54 0.59 0.08
+ Valuation changes 0.36 0.00 1.43 0.25 0.38
Source: Financial statements of central banks, differences due to rounding.
                                                                                                                                                             
only distributes realized revaluation gains as well, whereas at the Czech National Bank all revaluation
gains are distributed which adds a volatile feature to their stated profits.
20 Most recently in Hochreiter and Rovelli (1999).
21 Only averages of yearly data on minimum reserves and on sterilization instruments have been available
from the Czech National Bank.___________________________________FRANZISKA SCHOBERT ________________________________
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Average seigniorage calculated by the fiscal concept is far lower than seigniorage calculated by
the more commonly used opportunity cost concept. Looking at the components of seigniorage
measured by the fiscal concept reveals the differences.
Net interest revenues are lower than one would expect by the opportunity cost concept. Mainly
responsible are lower returns earned on foreign assets compared to the returns implied by the
opportunity cost concept. Due to high inflation gaps to their anchor countries domestic nominal
interest rates have been relatively high as well over most of the periods. However these domestic
interest rates are not applicable for the fiscal concept but only for the opportunity cost concept.
Additionally, sterilisation costs have averaged at about 0.5-0.6 % of GDP in the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland. Sterilisation costs have not only been influenced by the volume of
outstanding sterilisation instruments, but also by the level of interest rates relative to interest rates
in anchor countries. Net interest revenues have not compensated for the losses born by the use of
costly sterilisation instruments. Only and not surprisingly again, Estonia has practically zero costs
on sterilisation and on valuation changes. The fiscal concept only deviates from the opportunity
cost concept because domestic interest rates in Estonia still bear a risk premium over foreign
interest rates. And due to its differentiated sterilisation in tolar and foreign exchange bills, the
Bank of Slovenia succeeded in limiting sterilisation costs
22, but total seigniorage remains fiscally
unimportant.
The case of Hungary shows that remunerating required reserves might be a hidden sterilisation
cost because the net interest revenues have been nil on average. Generally higher reserve
requirements offset the costs of sterilisation because part of the liquidity is blocked by minimum
reserve accounts bearing below market or no interest rates. So not reducing required reserves or
even increasing them will save costly sterilisation operations if they are not remunerated. But this
of course is in sharp contrast to more market oriented central banking policies, which these
countries should pursue on their way to EU.
Central banks do not explain the use of high minimum reserve requirements as less expensive
sterilisation instruments, but they openly admit the link between minimum reserve requirements
and sterilisation costs.
23 The Czech National Bank has actually increased reserve requirements
                                                
22 Sterilisation costs include costs on tolar bills and on foreign currency bills, although the costs on foreign
currency bills have even been negative over some periods, because the interest rate on these instruments
have been lower than the interest rates on foreign assets held against them. Sterilisation instruments as
shown in table A5 only include tolar bills.
23 For example, as stated in the annual report of the Czech National Bank the decrease of minimum
reserves by 2 %-points at the end of July 1998 has increased liquidity in the banking system which would
have caused higher sterilization costs, if the decrease of domestic interest rates due to lower inflation had
not decreased capital inflows and therefore the need for sterilization instruments.SEIGNIORAGE: AN ARGUMENT FOR A NATIONAL CURRENCY?
21
over some periods, though its true motivation for it remains unclear.
24 However reserve
requirements have been adjusted downwards and will approach the ratio of the European
Monetary Union (EMU) as countries will accede further to EU.
25 So, even if central banks have
postponed more progressive reductions of reserve requirements over previous years, they will
have to adjust to lower levels soon and thus will be unable to use reserve requirements as
inexpensive sterilisation instruments.
Valuation gains on average are only important in case of Hungary, but at all central banks apart
of the Bank of Estonia they have heavily influenced the overall positive results.
The concept “Implied EMU” measures seigniorage as if these countries would have been full
members of the Monetary Union and if the Monetary Union would have existed over the period
observed. Interest rates would have been considerably lower and minimum reserves would have
not generated seigniorage anymore. Only small differences arise between the countries, which are
mainly due to different behaviours in cash holdings. The calculation has only concentrated on
what these countries would have generated as seigniorage in EMU, but not what they would have
received. This in turn depends on their capital share at the ECB and can differ substantially in
cases, where the share of base money differs from the share in GDP and population in the
Eurosystem. Thus for countries, in which cash holdings are relatively low, seigniorage received
under full membership of EMU may be much higher than the figures presented under “Implied
EMU”.
4. Conclusions
The loss of seigniorage is often argued to be a major disadvantage of official dollarization or
euroisation because seigniorage is assumed to be an important source of fiscal revenues. This can
mean that it comprises a high share of fiscal revenues or GDP. Additionally, it can mean that
seigniorage is an emergency source of revenue which can be activated in case other sources of
fiscal revenues do not cover the financial needs of the government.
The first interpretation can be analysed by quantifying actual seigniorage after selecting a suitable
fiscal concept. No concept is generally applicable for measuring seigniorage and the choice of the
concept eventually depends on the specific environment, in which base money is created. In this
respect the fiscal concept is the most general concept for measuring the revenues from the
monopoly in base money, which can be distributed to the budget. The monetary and the
opportunity cost concept arise as special cases.
                                                
24 Reserve requirements on primary deposits increased from 8.5% in August 1995 to 11.5% in August
1996 and decreased slowly to 9.5% in May 1997, 7.5% in July 1998, 5% in January 1999 and finally 2%
in October 1999. Whether this was motivated by weaknesses of the banking business or by the attempt to
reduce sterilisation costs remains unclear.
25 Reserve requirements in the Eurosystem are 2% on all deposits and are remunerated at market interest
rates.___________________________________FRANZISKA SCHOBERT ________________________________
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In the second interpretation it is implicitly assumed that the central bank serves the government
without being sufficiently independent to withstand its financial needs. In such a weak
institutional framework borrowing at the central bank to cover current expenditutes takes place in
different forms, such as direct lending from the central bank, purchases of bonds which could not
be sold at the capital markets or refinancing of loans to state controlled enterprises. Seigniorage is
measured by the monetary concept, because the government is eventually not able or willing to
finance deficits with marketable bonds as an alternative.
The monetary concept is certainly applicable for Yugoslavia in the 1990s and it has been applied
to other less advanced Central and Eastern European countries. If at all, seigniorage has only
been fiscally important in high inflationary countries, though fiscal needs have been high.
Permanent shifts to other means of payments, i.e. currency substitution, have influenced the
relatively low success in collecting seigniorage. Not surprisingly, for less advanced Central and
Eastern European countries, that were successful in stabilising prices, seigniorage has no fiscal
significance. Accordingly euroisation will be an option for a government of an inflationary
economy, which is willing to stabilise prices but which lacks credibility to do so.
Monetary seigniorage, the real value of changes in base money, only measures a part of total
revenues enabled by the monopoly in base money. For example, it will only measure the
refinancing of a loan, which has been extended at soft conditions to state-controlled enterprises,
but not the loan itself. These additional sources of income will be limited to finance fiscal and
quasi fiscal deficits in these countries, if they euroise. So as an additional objective, a
government, which decides for euroisation, should also be willing to reform its fiscal policies and
its financial system. However, these reforms are needed anyway and postponing them should not
be a reason to hold on to a national currency.
In case of euroisation governments of less advanced countries in Central and Eastern Europe may
additionally have to face costs on loans, which they need to take up to acquire foreign currencies.
In contrast to central banks in advanced EU-accession countries, base money is often only partly
covered by foreign assets. If the relevant period of time until any potential entry to EMU is
expected to be quite long and/ or as the terms of the loan are quite favourable, this additional cost
has less weight in the overall assessment.
For more advanced Central and Eastern European countries which are aiming at an early EU-
accession and are therefore aiming for a high degree of central bank independence and stable
prices seigniorage is not an actively exploited source of fiscal revenue. It rather arises with other
activities of the central bank, namely its interventions in the foreign exchange market.
Seigniorage in more advanced EU-accession countries has been a by-product of the operations,
which were used to achieve their central banks objectives of achieving price and exchange rate
stability. It has been relatively low and its overall positive result has often depended on valuation
gains. These countries have actually struggled to manage their national currencies in anSEIGNIORAGE: AN ARGUMENT FOR A NATIONAL CURRENCY?
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environment of high and volatile capital flows unless they only targeted one objective, namely
exchange rate stability as in Estonia. Having a monopoly in base money is not only a source of
revenues but also a source of expenses for central banks in these countries, because part of the
excess liquidity created by foreign exchange interventions was drained by the sale of costly
sterilisation instruments. Using less costly sterilisation instruments, such as postponing
reductions of high minimum reserve requirements will be limited for the countries, as they move
closer to-EU-accession.
Euroisation may become an option from a fiscal point of view as governments of these countries
have not earned much from their monopoly in base money. The governments have limited or
stopped the sources of fiscal exploitation of the monopoly in base money by stronger institutional
frameworks. Additionally, euroisation would only imply temporary losses of seigniorage until
their entry to EMU. Any further costs of loans, which other countries would need to take up to
substitute cash in domestic currency into cash in foreign currency, do not occur, because base
money is already more than covered with marketable foreign assets.
Low and volatile seigniorage mainly resulting from a depreciating exchange rate may become
increasingly disturbing for a central bank, because costs of sterilisation and potential valuation
losses from adverse exchange rate movements can eventually outweigh interest revenues on its
asset portfolio. The government may then have an additional reason to reconsider the choice of
its monetary regime either towards more truly floating regimes or towards euroisation, which
offers a way to achieve price stability without any exchange rate volatility in liberalised capital
markets.___________________________________FRANZISKA SCHOBERT ________________________________
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Appendix
Table A1. Seigniorage of selected countries in Eastern Europe
Seigniorage
in % of
output
Seigniorage in
% of total
fiscal revenues
Inflation
in %
Real GDP
change in %
FCD ratio
in %
Cash ratio
in %
Montenegro
1995 1.5 2.7 104.1 14.1 17.6 27.3
1996 2.1 3.5 47.2 27.7 21.6 30.2
1997 2.1 2.9 18.1 6.6 38.7 23.2
1998 0.6 1.0 44.8 -1.5 49.3 17.0
1999 0.6 1.4 146.0 -13.8 63.0 11.9
Av 95-99 1.4 2.3 72.0 6.6 38.0 21.9
Macedonia
1995 1.1 4.7 15.8 -1.1 16.3 31.8
1996 -0.1 -0.4 2.3 1.2 15.0 35.7
1997 1.0 3.0 2.6 1.4 20.8 30.5
1998 0.3 0.9 -0.1 2.9 22.9 26.5
1999 1.6 4.5 -0.4 2.7 20.5 23.2
Av 95-99 0.8 2.5 4.0 1.4 19.1 29.5
Croatia
1995 2.1 4.4 3.7 6.8 57.6 13.7
1996 1.9 4.1 3.4 6.0 59.7 17.3
1997 1.3 2.9 3.8 6.5 61.8 14.4
1998 -0.3 -0.6 5.6 2.5 66.4 13.1
1999 0.2 0.5 4.6 -2.1 65.2 10.5
Av 95-99 1.0 2.3 4.2 3.9 62.1 13.8
Albania
1995 5.1 22.9 6 8.9 18.7 39.0
1996 2.7 14.9 17.4 9.1 21.9 30.9
1997 8.6 38.9 42.1 -7 18.3 36.6
1998 -0.2 -1.4 8.7 -8 16.8 28.5
1999 1.7 9.5 0 7.3 19.5 27.1
Av 95-99 3.6 17.0 14.8 2.1 19.0 32.4SEIGNIORAGE: AN ARGUMENT FOR A NATIONAL CURRENCY?
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Belarus
1995 4.2 12.0 244 -10.4 30.7 21.1
1996 2.9 7.2 39 2.8 19.5 18.3
1997 3.7 8.0 63 11.4 21.4 16.7
1998 6.1 12.8 182 8.4 35.7 8.0
1999 4.1 8.8 251 3.4 30.4 12.0
Av 95-99 4.2 9.8 155.8 3.1 27.5 15.2
Ukraine
1995 3.7 9.6 181.7 -12.2 22.8 49.0
1996 1.6 4.2 39.7 -10 15.5 36.5
1997 2.3 6.1 10.1 -3 11.8 43.1
1998 1.5 4.2 20 -1.7 17.5 37.6
1999 2.7 7.5 19.2 -1.2 24.5 44.1
Av 95-99 2.4 6.3 54.1 -5.6 18.4 42.0
Romania
1995 2.0 6.5 27.8 7.1 22.6 20.6
1996 2.9 9.8 56.9 3.9 23.4 17.7
1997 1.1 3.9 151.4 -6.1 28.4 14.8
1998 2.4 7.8 40.6 -5.4 32.6 12.5
1999 2.9 8.6 54.8 -3.2 37.6 13.0
Av 95-99 2.3 7.3 66.3 -0.7 28.9 15.7
Inflation: Dec. to Dec. change of CPI index (RPI for Albania and Croatia). FCD ratio: foreign currency deposits in %
of broad money (including foreign currency deposits). cash ratio (cash in national currency outside banks in % of
broad money (including foreign currency deposits). fiscal revenues: taxes, social contributions, customs duties
(excluded in Montenegro)
.28
Table A2. Lending to the government
26
Country Limit Maturity Legal Act
Albania 5% of the annual average of the Government of the Republic of Albania ordinary
revenue for the three preceding financial years and exceptional temporary waiver not
exceeding 8% of it
Exceptions are possible if government debt arises due to membership in
international organisations.
Purchases of government bonds in the secondary market are possible. Under certain
conditions they do not add up to the overall limit on government debt.
Max. 6 months Art 30, 31, 32 of the Law
on the Bank of Albania
Croatia 5% of the budget for the current year (to be banned in the new law) Not beyond the end of
the fiscal year
Art. 57, 58 Law on the Croatian
National Bank (amended version 1994)
Czech Republic No direct lending to the Republic or its bodies, regional authorities, bodies governed
by public law or legal entities under the control of the state, a regional authority or a
body governed by public law (with the exception of banks) not even through the
purchase of bonds from such entities (unless in order to regulate the money market).
Art. 30 (2), 32 Act on the Czech
National Bank
Estonia No direct or indirect granting of credits to the government, no buying of government
securities
Law on the Central Bank of the
Republic of Estonia
Hungary 2% of the planned budget revenue of the actual year 15 days in a calendar
month
Art. 18 (4) of the Act LX of 1991 on the
National Bank of Hungary (last
amended 1997)
Macedonia 5% of the current budget, but exceptions allowed if the Republic has debt due to
regulations of external debt or membership in international organisations
Usually not beyond the
end of the fiscal year
Art 46 of the National Bank of the
Republic of Macedonia Act
Poland No direct lending to the government Art. 220.2 of the Constitution
Romania 7% of the State budget revenues of the previous year 180 days Art 29(4) The National Bank of
Romania Act
Slovenia 5% of the budget of the Republic of the current year and 1/5 of total anticipated
budget deficit
Not beyond the end of
the fiscal year
Law of the Bank of Slovenia, Art. 61
Ukraine No direct lending to finance expenses of the State Budget Art. 54 of the Law of Ukraine on the
National Bank of Ukraine
Yugoslavia 10% of the planned yearly budget Short term Art. 34 of the Federal Law on the
National Bank of Yugoslavia
                                                
26 Based on central bank laws and on Hochreiter, and Kowalski (2000).29
Table A3. Seigniorage by concepts in the Czech Republic
in million € (or stated
otherwise)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Opportunity cost 740 793 942 893 401 309
in % of GDP 1.95 1.73 2.13 1.73 0.79 0.58
Implied EMU 314 122 109 136 131 226
in % of GDP 0.83 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.43
Fiscal concept 91 -557 975 -1.132 956 120
in % of GDP 0.24 -1.22 2.21 -2.20 1.88 0.23
of which
Net interest revenues 135 258 226 254 213 120
in % of GDP 0.36 0.56 0.51 0.49 0.42 0.23
Sterilisation costs 285 493 216 437 195 27
in % of GDP 0.75 1.08 0.49 0.85 0.38 0.05
Valuation gains 241 -322 965 -949 938 27
in % of GDP 0.63 -0.70 2.19 -1.84 1.84 0.05
Base money to GDP in % 18.38 13.8 14.2 12.4 11.7 11.0
Inflation (CPI) in % 9.1 8.8 8.5 10.7 2.1 3.9
Source: Financial statements of the Czech National Bank, statistical office.30
 Table A4. Seigniorage by concepts in Estonia
in million € (or stated otherwise) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Opportunity cost 15.17 12.12 30.55 61.49 26.38 25.96
in % of GDP 0.58 0.36 0.74 1.31 0.55 0.48
Implied EMU 10.9 9.66 11.03 12.13 10.83 16.13
in % of GDP 0.42 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.23 0.30
Fiscal concept 13.09 11.39 14.68 18.82 14.29 17.06
in % of GDP 0.50 0.34 0.36 0.40 0.30 0.32
of which
Net interest revenues 13.11 11.4 14.68 18.83 14.29 17.06
in % of GDP 0.50 0.34 0.36 0.40 0.30 0.32
Sterilisation costs 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
in % of GDP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Base money to GDP in % 9.32 10.27 10.79 11.41 12.24 10.92
Inflation (CPI) in % 28.9 23.1 11.1 8.2 3.3 4
Source: Financial statements of the National Bank of Hungary, statistical office.31
Table A5. Seigniorage by concepts in Hungary
in million € (or stated otherwise) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Opportunity cost 829 920 855 760 737 572
in % of GDP 2.16 2.77 2.22 1.93 1.65 1.25
Implied EMU 91 79 86 91 131 138
in % of GDP 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.30
Fiscal concept 882 288 82 465 88 262
in % of GDP 2.29 0.87 0.21 1.18 0.20 0.57
of which
Net interest revenues 1 -40 -39 -0 23 76
in % of GDP 0.00 -0.12 -0.10 0.00 0.05 0.17
Sterilisation costs 15 225 345 369 221 97
in % of GDP 0.04 0.68 0.90 0.94 0.49 0.21
Valuation gains 896 553 466 834 286 283
in % of GDP 2.33 1.67 1.21 2.12 0.64 0.62
Base money to GDP in % 7.8 16.4 10.4 10.2 10.5 10.9
Inflation (CPI) in % 28.2 23.6 18.3 14.3 10.0 9.8
Source: Financial statements of the National Bank of Hungary, statistical office.32
Table A6. Seigniorage by concepts in Poland
in million €  (or stated otherwise) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Opportunity cost 2.252 2.215 2.824 2.433 1.667 2266
in % of GDP 2.48 2.08 2.31 1.81 1.22 1.27
Implied EMU 252 227 228 277 264 401
in % of GDP 0.28 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.15 0.23
Fiscal concept 123 270 -765 -22 1.667 -1.291
in % of GDP 0.14 0.25 -0.63 -0.02 1.13 -0.73
of which
Net interest revenues 375 376 430 525 485 635.5
(in % of GDP) 0.41 0.35 0.35 0.39 0.33 0.35
Sterilisation costs 260 205 1.359 1.231 614 1089.3
(in % of GDP) 0.29 0.19 1.11 0.92 0.42 0.61
Valuation gains 9 98 163 684 1.795 -836.7
(in % of GDP) 0.01 0.09 0.13 0.51 1.22 -0.47
Base money to GDP in % 9.3 8.2 8.5 9.0 8.9 7.1
Inflation (CPI) in % 27.8 19.9 14.9 11.8 7.3 9.0
Source: Financial statements of the National Bank of Poland, statistical office.33
Table A7. Seigniorage by concepts in Slovenia
in million € (or stated otherwise) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Opportunity cost 62 65 79 98 95 112
in % of GDP 0.45 0.47 0.57 0.71 0.69 0.81
Implied EMU 15 12 12 17 17 26
in % of GDP 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.14
Fiscal concept 31 79 77 2 144 149
in % of GDP 0.22 0.55 0.50 0.01 0.78 0.78
of which
Net interest revenues 25 22 23 31 32 44
in % of GDP 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.17 0.23
Sterilisation costs 4 6 34 16 13 7
in % of GDP 0.03 0.04 0.22 0.09 0.07 0.04
Valuation gains 10 63 88 -13 125 113
in % of GDP 0.07 0.44 0.57 -0.07 0.68 0.59
Base money to GDP in % 4.2 5.0 6.0 7.5 9.0 9.7
Inflation (CPI) in % 13.5 9.9 8.4 7.9 6.1 8.9
Source: financial statements of the National Bank of Hungary, statistical office.34
Table A8. Chosen variables and assumptions for the calculation of seigniorage
Sterilisation instruments Interest rate on sterilisation
instruments and as rate of
opportunity cost
Assumed structure of foreign assets Exchange rate regime
Czech National Bank (CNB) Other liabilities to
domestic banks
Repo rate (2 weeks)** 35% USD, 65% DEM/ EUR until May 26, 1998: basket peg
35 % USD, 65 % DEM
since May 27, 1998: managed float
National Bank of Hungary
(NBH)
Repurchase agreements
and forint non-callable
deposits, NBH domestic
bills held by resident
credit institutions
Base rate until end of 1999:
30% USD, 70% DEM/ EUR
since 2000: 100 % EUR
crawling peg regime to basket
until end of 1996: 30% USD, 70% ECU,
until end of 1999: 30 % USD, 70%
DEM,
since 2000: 100% EUR
National Bank of Poland
(NBP)
Liabilities to banks from
open market operations
and others, securities
issued by the NBP
Basic refinancing rate until end of 1998:
45% USD, 35% DEM, 10% GBP, 5%
FF, 5% SF)
since 1999: 45 USD, 55% EUR
Crawling band regime to basket
until end of 1998: 45% USD, 35%
DEM, 10% GBP, 5% FF, 5% SF,
until April 11, 2000: 45% USD, 55%
EUR
since April 12, 2000: full floating
Bank of Slovenia Tolar and foreign
exchange bills
Bill rates on sterilisation
instrument, Average between
lombard and discount rate as
rate of opportunity cost
1995: 64% EUR/ 36% USD
1996/97: 70% EUR/ 30% USD
1998: 68% EUR/ 32% USD
1999: 69% EUR/ 31% USD
2000: 74% EUR/ 26% USD
Managed float
Eesti Pank Securities (CD’s) Overnight lending rate 100% DEM/ EUR Currency board to DEM/ EUR
* (Discount + lombard rate)/2 in 1995 (Jan-Nov), Pribor 2 weeks in 2000.35
Balance sheets of central banks (calculated from monthly averages)
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Evolution of base money, foreign assets and claims to banks:
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Annex
A.1 Budget accounting
A.1.1 Inferring concepts of seigniorage
Concepts of seigniorage may be inferred from different presentations of the government’s budget
constraint.
27 In order to compare the concepts, it is assumed that no costs and valuation changes
occur.
As has been described in part 1 the opportunity cost concept equals the fiscal concept, if base
money is either created by purchasing outstanding government bonds or assets outside the
government sector. In contrast, the monetary concept will arise as a special case of the fiscal
concept, if base money is created with financing government expenditures in the same period. This
is most obvious the case, if the central bank directly lends to the fiscal authorities, but it may also be
the case, if the central bank purchases government bonds in the primary markets, i.e. it monetises
newly issued government debt in the same period.
First, assume that the central bank issues base money by purchasing outstanding government bonds.
Thus the fiscal concept is given by 
cb
t t
f
t b i s 1 1 - - =  and equals the opportunity cost concept
1 1 - - = t t
o
t h i s , because base money in this case is covered with government bonds.
The identity for the fiscal branch of a government is
A.1
F
t t t t t t t S B B T B i G + - + = + - - - 1 1 1
where upper case letters are nominal variables. Government expenditures,  t G , and interest
expenditures on total outstanding bonds,  1 1 - - ￿ t t B i , are financed with tax revenues  t T , changes in
bonds,  1 - - t t B B , and seigniorage received from the central bank, 
F
t S .
Total bonds of the government,  t B , comprise bonds held by the public, 
P
t B or at the central bank,
CB
t B .
The budget identity of the central bank is
A.3 ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 - - - - - + ￿ = + - t t
CB
t t
F
t
CB
t
CB
t H H B i S B B
where changes in government bonds held at the central bank  ) ( 1
CB
t
CB
t B B - -  and seigniorage
distributed to the fiscal branch of the government equals interest revenues on these government
                                                
27 See Walsh (1998), pp. 132-147.41
bonds and changes in the own liabilities of the central bank, i.e. changes in base money
) ( 1 - - t t H H .
Combining the budget identities of the fiscal branch and the central bank produces the consolidated
government-sector budget identity:
A.4 ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 - - - - - + - + = + t t
P
t
P
t t
P
t t t H H B B T B i G
The funds available to the consolidated government sector originate from three sources: taxes,
newly issued bonds held by the public and newly issued base money as noninterest-bearing debt.
Accordingly, from the perspective of the consolidated government sector, the last two terms on the
right hand side of the equation comprise total new debt issued by the government, but only debt
held by the public and thus outside the government sector represents an interest-bearing liability.
Dividing A.4 by the price level,  t P , equation A.4 can be shown in real terms (indicated by lower
case letters)
28
A.5
t
t t p
t
p
t t
p
t t t P
H H
b b b r g
1
1 1 1
-
- -
•
-
-
+ - + = ￿ + t
where  1
1
1 1
1 -
+
+
=
- •
-
t
t
t
i
r
p
Adding and subtracting the term 
) 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1
1
t
t t p
t
r
b
p
p
+
+ ￿ +
￿
-
- from the left hand side and
rearranging gives:
A.6
t
t t p
t
t
e
t t t p
t
p
t t
p
t t t P
H H
b
r
b b b r g 1
1
1
1 1 1 ) 1 (
) ( ) 1 ( -
-
-
- - -
-
+ ￿
+
- ￿ +
+ - + = ￿ +
p
p p
t
where  1
1
1 1
1 -
+
+
= -
- e
t
t
t
i
r
p
The third term on the right hand side, 
p
t t
e
t t t b r 1 1 ) 1 /( ) ( ) 1 ( - - ￿ + - ￿ + p p p , represents
reductions of the real value of the government’s outstanding interest-bearing nominal debt when
inflation is unanticipated and thus has not been correctly priced into nominal interest rates.
                                                
28 Bonds of the previous period are presented as  t t t t t t t t b P P P B P B p + ￿ = ￿ = - - - - - 1 / 1 / / / 1 1 1 1 1  and then
rearranged.42
Reductions of debt denominated in domestic currency due to unanticipated inflation
29 should not be
confused with the inflation tax, which arises as part of seigniorage as shown in A7. Here changes in
base money are rearranged into:
A.7 1 1 1
1
1
- - -
- ￿
+
+ - = ￿ =
-
t
t
t
t t t t
t
t t h h h h
P
H H
p
p
q
The first term on the right hand side of A.7 gives the change in real base money holdings leaving
velocity constant. The second term is normally regarded as the inflation tax. Assuming, that the
growth of base money is either driven by real growth (population and economic growth) or by
inflation, these revenues will arise, even if the economy is stationary. However, the interpretation
appears to imply that the government then receives no revenue if additionally inflation is zero. The
inference neglects the real interest savings to the government of issuing base money as opposed to
bonds. For a given level of total liabilities of the government, interest costs will decrease, if base
money takes up an increasing share of total liabilities. A shift from interest-bearing debt (bonds held
by the public, i.e. outside the central bank) to noninterest-bearing debt (base money) would allow
the government to reduce total tax revenues or increase government expenditures or both. Using
equation A.6 and A.7 and assuming that inflation is fully anticipated, gives
A.9 1 1 1 1 1 1
- - - - - ￿
+
+ - + - + = ￿ + t
t
t
t t
p
t
p
t t
p
t t t h h h b b b r g
p
p
t
Adding  1 1 - - ￿ t t h r  to both sides of the equation gives the government’s budget constraint
expressed in terms of total liabilities of the government.
A.10 1
1
1 1 1 1
-
-
- - - ￿
+
+ - + = ￿ + t
t
t
t t t t t t h
i
d d d r g
p
t
where  d resembles total liabilities of the government, i.e. bonds held outside the government
sector and base money. In this case  d actually equals total outstanding bonds,  b, because base
money is backed with government bonds held at the central bank. The opportunity cost on base
money depends directly on the nominal rate of interest. It includes the rate on the inflation tax
t
t
p
p
+ 1
 and the rate of return, the government would have to offer as an opportunity cost if it were
not able to issue base money  1 - t r .
Thus, seigniorage measured by the monetary concept ignores any interest savings due to the
privilege of the government to issue base money as noninterest-bearing debt. If the government has
no alternative of financing deficits than to print money, i.e. it has no access to bond financing at
capital markets, these opportunity costs do not apply to this situation (but other opportunity costs
may apply as discussed in part 3). The monetary concept will reflect the choice of the government,
                                                
29 Or equivalently, unanticipated depreciation when measuring variables in a foreign currency.43
namely financing government deficits by directly lending at the central bank. The fiscal concept
measures seigniorage by the lending activity to the government in each period  t
f
t c s = , which
directly translates into changes in base money and thus into the monetary concept.
The budget identity of the central bank, A.3, reduces to
A3.a
F
t t t S T G + =
and the governments budget constraint expressed in terms of total liabilities of the government
becomes
A.10a 1 - ￿ + = t t t t h g q t
If the central bank issues base money exclusively by purchasing assets outside the government
sector, the result of the analysis will not change to the first case, where the central bank purchases
outstanding government bonds, but the reasoning is different. The fiscal concept is given by
1 1 - - = t t
f
t a i s  and equals the opportunity cost concept  1 1 - - = t t
o
t h i s , because base money
now is covered with assets.
The budget identity of the central bank, A.3, becomes
A.3b ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 - - - - - + ￿ = + - t t t t
F
t t t H H A i S A A
And the consolidated government-sector budget identity, A.4, is now
A.4b ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 - - - - - + - + = + t t t t t t t t H H B B T B i G
because total bonds are held outside the government sector. Expressed in real variables, assuming
again fully anticipated inflation and adding  1 1 - - ￿ t t h r  yields A.10.
The opportunity costs arise more indirectly, because the central bank now receives assets and
thereby the government accumulates wealth. In contrast, issuing base money by purchasing
government bonds has just shifted already existing interest-bearing debt to noninterest-bearing debt.
Arguing with the opportunity cost is easier in case of purchasing outstanding government bonds,
which have financed budget deficits. In case net assets are purchased the opportunity cost argument
will hold, if the purchase of assets is compulsory for the government. For example the government
must build up foreign exchange reserves, which it otherwise had financed with interest-bearing
debt.
A.1.2 Linking seigniorage and government wealth
So far the analysis showed, that concepts of seigniorage can be derived from different processes of
base money creation and that they can be inferred from budget identities of the government. The
following analysis shows that base money can either be backed by marketable assets or by
government indebtedness. The distinction may be important for a government, which considers the44
unilateral adoption of a foreign currency. Therefore, the effect of seigniorage on government wealth
is shown. The analysis is extended for infinite periods over which an intertemporal balanced budget
is required. The government’s wealth constraint is then given by
A.11 W + = + w b h
p
which defines that total assets of the government, w, will be either financed with base money,  h, or
with bonds held outside the government sector,  p b . Assuming, that assets and outstanding bonds
bear the same rate of return, A.11 can be written as
A.12 W + = a h
where 
p b w a - = . Net assets arise by virtue of the monopoly in base money. For example, a
central bank purchases foreign assets in exchange of base money by its privilege to issue
noninterest-bearing paper money. In contrast, if a government finances budget deficits by directly
borrowing from the central bank, it will increase its indebtedness.
But issuing base money by purchasing government bonds can either result in net assets or in net
government indebtedness backing base money.
To underline the argument, assume two extreme cases. In the first case the central bank purchases
government bonds, but a balanced budget is always required. Bonds can only be issued to finance
new assets, thus any retirement of outstanding bonds increases net assets. And as the issuance of
base money induces an equivalent retirement of interest bearing debt, base money is always backed
by net assets and grows each period by  1 - ￿ t t a q . The wealth constraint reduces to  w b h
p = +  or
a h = .
If only an intertemporal budget balance is required, the issuance of new bonds can also finance
budget deficits over some periods and than be retired over other periods. In this case a retirement of
bonds does not necessarily increase net assets backing base money.
To stress the other extreme assume the second case, in which the issuance of bonds only finance
budget deficits by base money and not the purchase of assets. A central bank which purchases
bonds when issuing base money then shifts a financing of budget deficits by bonds to a financing by
base money. Whereas the financing of deficits by bonds is only possible temporarily, because an
intertemporal balanced budget is required, the financing of deficits by base money is permanent,
because base money is considered as a nonrepayable liability. The government wealth constraint
becomes  W = h . Base money is now backed by net government indebtedness, which resembles
the sum of all budget deficits financed by base money.
Does it matter whether base money is backed by net assets or by net government indebtedness? It
matters for a country, which considers dollarization or euroisation. The financial implication will be
shown in appendix A2.
A1.3 Base money creation by purchasing government bonds45
So far the analysis has shown that issuing base money by purchasing government bonds may either
increase net assets or net government indebtedness. Only the latter case represents a financing of
budget deficits and therefore may cause the exploitation of the inflation tax. However, issuing
bonds to finance budget deficits is generally assumed to be the more relevant case in practice. So
the analysis will concentrate on it. It is shown, that purchases of these bonds may only lead to
inflationary financing as one of several choices. Additionally, it is shown, that purchases of
outstanding government bonds generally finance past budget deficits and that in this case the fiscal
concept equals the opportunity cost concept. However, in the special situation, in which the central
bank purchases bonds, which are issued to finance current budget deficits, the fiscal concept may
equal the monetary concept.
The budget equation of the consolidated government sector for each period is given by
A14 1 1 1 1 - - - - ￿ + - + = ￿ + t t
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Assuming a constant real interest rate, the equation can be solved forward to obtain:
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+ ￿ . The government’s expenditure and tax plans are said to
satisfy the requirement of intertemporal budget balance (the “no Ponzi condition”) if the last term
equals zero.
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Accordingly, equation A.15 can be written as
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The right side of A16 becomes the present discounted value of all current and future government
expenditures and tax and seigniorage revenues. It equals current outstanding debt, 
p
t b 1 - , which has
financed past deficits. The government must plan to raise sufficient revenues or reduce its
expenditures, in present-value terms, to repay its existing debt, if the intertemporal budget balance
holds over infinite periods.
Base money creation by purchases of outstanding bonds retires debt, which has financed past
deficits. Seigniorage therefore finances past budget deficits and not current government
expenditures, which are instead financed by new bonds. The intertemporal budget balance will hold
                                                
30 See e.g. Walsh (1998), p. 138.46
if the government revises its future plans and it has basically two choices. Either it reduces
government expenditures and/ or it increases taxes. Or it finances the deficit with future
seigniorage. It will lead to higher inflation in this framework, if the growth in base money is not
sustained by real growth and if the velocity of base money either stays constant or even increases.
If the central bank purchases bonds, which are issued to finance expenditures during the same
period, the choice of the government will be the same, though the reasoning will be modified. The
central bank will not retire outstanding bonds, but it will only purchase newly issued bonds and thus
directly finance current primary deficits. The government now still has an unchanged stock of
outstanding debt bt-1, which is not consistent with the required intertemporal budget balance. The
present value of future primary deficits must be revised, i.e. the government must reduce its planned
future government expenditures and/or increase future taxes. Or seigniorage is increased to generate
the surpluses and may then lead to inflationary financing.
The only difference, which occurs between the purchasing government bonds,which have financed
past deficits or current deficits, is the fiscal income during the same period. If already outstanding
bonds are purchased, which have financed past deficits, the fiscal income will equal seigniorage
measured by the opportunity cost concept. But if the central bank purchases bonds, which the
government issued to finance current expenditures, the central bank actually finances current
expenditures. The monetary concept will be more applicable in this case, if the government is either
not able or not willing to sell the bonds on the capital market. The case of the National Bank of
Ukraine described in part 3.1 gives an example of avoiding market determined prices for financing
deficits.
In practice it is hard to foresee the implications of purchasing government bonds at the central bank.
It may just reflect central banking operations, which are conducted to implement monetary policies
without any fiscal intentions. But if an intertemporal budget balance is required, an exploitation of
the inflation tax remains eventually one of several choices. Central bank laws, which strictly
prohibit purchases of government bonds as well as direct lending to the government, support this
view. Some central bank laws are less strict and only prohibit purchases of government bonds at the
primary market whereas they will allow purchases of bonds at the secondary market, if the
transaction is used to achieve the objectives of the central bank and to carry out its tasks (see for
example the article 18 of the statute of the European System of Central Banks). Prohibiting
purchases at the primary market therefore can be seen as an attempt to limit fiscal financing.
A.2 Measuring losses on seigniorage after euroisation
In the following example losses on seigniorage are analysed for an economy in which base money
is generated either by creating net assets (case I) or by lending to the government (case II). Case I
may be an example of a central bank, which is financially independent, because it only acquires
assets outside the government sector when issuing base money. In contrast case II gives an example
of a central bank, which may serve the fiscal needs of the government by issuing base money and
receiving claims to the government. The most important difference for the following analysis arises
in case of euroisation. If the economy in case I euroises it will have a sufficient backing of base47
money by marketable assets, whereas the economy in case II would need to take up a loan to
acquire cash in euro which substitutes for cash in domestic currency.
Let  t p , rt and  t n denote the inflation rate, the real interest rate and the domestic real growth rate in
period t . For simplicity, they are assumed to be constant over time and equal, respectively, to r,
pand n. And assume that the income elasticity of the demand for real balances and the elasticity of
nominal balances with regards to the price level are unity and other velocity changes do not exist.
Real balances accordingly grow at the rate  n and nominal balances at the rate  p + n . For
analytical purposes base money and cash in circulation are identical.
Case I: Base money is fully backed by net assets
Assume, the central bank issues base money by receiving assets in exchange, for example it creates
base money by interventions in the foreign exchange market. Assume again, that costs and
valuation changes do not occur, i.e. the evolution of base money equals the evolution of net assets at
the central bank and the flow of seigniorage in each period consists of the interest revenues on the
net assets held as counterparts of base money.
Defining  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 n + ￿ + = + p m , the nominal value of net assets in period t is equal to
n t n
t A A 0 ) 1 ( ￿ + = m  and the present discounted value of seigniorage, PDVS
I, is given by: 
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In order to arrive at a steady state value, r>n is postulated as a standard condition in dynamic
optimisation, so i>m.
Case II: The counterpart of base money is net government indebtedness
Now the central bank issues base money to cover budget deficits and the government has no access
to financial markets. Seigniorage is measured by the monetary concept,  1 - ￿ t h q , whereq equals
p + n , because velocity changes of base money are assumed to be zero. The growth rate of base
money includes the inflation rate in order to offset changes in real base money due to a rising price
level. The present discounted value of seigniorage (PDVS) gives
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31 For similar results see Schmidt-Grohe and Uribe (1999).48
or over a sufficiently long period:
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If the country unilaterally euroises the loss on foregone seigniorage is measured by PDVS
I in case I
and by PDVS
II in case II. But the economy in case II additionally needs to take up a loan to acquire
foreign cash substituting domestic cash.
Let 
II
I
PDVS
PDVS
” r be the ratio of the loss of seigniorage in case I and in case II, r is given for a
sufficiently long period by
m
r
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Because  m > i  according to the standard condition the country in case I will always suffer a higher
loss of seigniorage. Because H0=A0, the difference between 
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The difference between losses in case I and in case II equals the nominal value of base money at the
time the economy became euroised. It is the value of the loan, which the economy in case II needs
to take up in case of euroisation. The loan actually finances past deficits, which have been financed
with base money so far. So in contrast to corporate finance the loan finances past debt and no new
investment. Accordingly, the government services past budget deficits, which it would otherwise
not redeem, if it held on to its monopoly in base money.
Imagine for example a non-repayable loan of the value L=H0 with infinite constant interest
payments. The present discounted value of borrowing  (PDVB) is given by
0 H
i
i
PDVB L ￿ =
where  L i is the interest rate paid on the loan and i  is the discount rate.
32 Assuming that the interest
rate on the loan and the discount rate are equal, the present value of borrowing is equal to the initial
value of base money, H 0. The economy in case I and in case II face the same costs when they
euroise.
                                                
32 The relevant discount rate is the rate at which seigniorage is earned each period. It presents the opportunity
cost on the loan, because seigniorage would be earned if no loan is taken up to substitute cash in domestic
currency for cash in foreign currency.49
However, before drawing conclusions on the theoretical analysis several caveats have to be kept in
mind:
The analysis is based on the steady state assumption, in which interest rates are equal and like
growth rates and inflation are constant over time and in which the steady state condition  n r >
always holds. Especially for shorter time horizons economic developments might significantly
deviate from steady state conditions. Time horizons of just a couple of years are relevant for many
EU-accession countries and maybe even for non EU-accession countries, which attempt to join the
group of accession countries. For them, any measurement of seigniorage based on infinite horizons
and on steady state assumptions may be misleading, as velocity changes to base money may lead to
very different results than those derived from steady state conditions. And the interest rate on net
assets backing base money depends on the portfolio structure which in turn depends on the process
of base money creation. In particular when comparing foreign nominal interest rates with domestic
growth rates of base money the standard condition   n r > does not seem to be plausible any
more.
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Additionally, EU-accession countries only temporarily face losses on seigniorage as discussed in
part 2. Central banks, which have backed base money by assets only lose interest income on assets
held against base money over a couple of years. This foregone income may then be far less then lost
seigniorage due to monetary financing  plus the costs of a loan, which has been taken up to
substitute base money in domestic currency.
However, an economy without marketable assets backing base money may not need to take up a
loan to substitute total domestic cash by foreign cash. Depending on the degree of currency
substitution the government may only supply part of the cash in foreign currency because the other
part is already used in the economy for transaction purposes. Technically the government would not
substitute total cash financed by the loan, but it could attract a share of cash in foreign currency by
legalising unofficial currency substitution. In an economy which runs a large share of its payments
in foreign currency the crucial amount of cash for a successful changeover to another currency is
then not the amount which totally substitutes domestic cash, but the amount which enables the
government to fulfil its payment obligations in cash. Both currencies could circulate officially and
by introducing a flexible exchange rate between the old domestic currency and the official foreign
currency the government would simply wait until cash in domestic currency has depreciated and has
been driven out of circulation. Though technically feasible, a government conducting sound and
prudent policies would have to consider a retirement of base money as part of its total outstanding
debt.
                                                
33 Even without this precondition the condition may not hold practically and theoretically. Bohn (1995) has
shown that for dynamically efficient economies the safe interest can be below the average growth rate in a
stocastic environment and has stressed the empirical relevance for the United states for most of the twentieth
century.50
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